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Abstract. The article aims to answer the 
following research question: “How were actors 
mobilized to form a network for promoting micro-
financing system in a transforming country?”. 
For this case study, we employ the actor-network 
theory (ANT) as a lens and interpretation tool. We 
used the focus research, in-depth interviews, and 
analysis of documents as sources in our study. The 
article shows how the different purposes of each 
actor can affect or hinder the achievement of be-
nefits for all actors. We pointed to the goals and 
problems they had to achieve to create a network 
to reach the primary goal which was the creation 
of a sustainable market economy in Poland. We 
pointed to the goals the focal actors (government, 
SMEs, banks, NGOs) had to achieve to create the 
network and to build a sustainable market eco-
nomy. The microfinancing network created by the 
actors works quite successfully. It enables access 
to capital to entrepreneurs who would not get it 
from banks. However, unethical acts committed 
by some actors may cause the system to collapse 
or change in the future, as actors will adopt diffe-
rent goals and new actors will join in. A change 
in the method of the guarantee funds’ financing, 
limitation of EU financial resources, changing the 
needs of entrepreneurs, further transformations of 
the Polish banking system - all these events may 
result in the creation of a new network of connecti-
ons and a new system.
Key words: Actor Network Theory, loans, gu-
arantees, banks, SME, transition country
1. INTRODUCTION
Small firms are likely to face difficult ac-
cess to external financing due to lack of ad-
equate collaterals and limited financial track 
records. This issue is particularly important 
in countries that have transformed a centrally 
planned system to a free-market economy. 
In countries like Poland, Czech Republic, 
Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, 
Bulgaria there are numerous small and me-
dium-sized enterprises (SMEs) founded and 
operated with low capital. 
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SMEs’ applications for loans are often 
denied because of difficulties in assess-
ing their creditworthiness and credit risk 
(Berger & Udell, 1990). Creditors who be-
lieve that SME managers do not have the 
knowledge to plan investments, analyse 
competition, analyse cash flows and as-
sess the environmental impact will always 
assess the credit risk of SMEs higher than 
large companies. 
Credit rationing is present in credit 
markets due to imperfect information 
flows. When banks make credit decisions, 
they take into account interest rates, the 
potential risk of loans and how their deci-
sions affect the risk levels of loans due to 
unfavourable choices and moral hazard 
(see Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Besanko 
and Thakor (1987) argue that the imper-
fect flows of information prevent borrow-
ers, who plan profitable investments, but 
do not have sufficient collateral to face 
credit rationing. It leads to an equity gap 
phenomenon, i. e. the amount of additional 
money needed to finance the current ac-
tivities and investments of enterprises, 
mainly SMEs. The equity gap phenome-
non is used to justify government interven-
tion in credit markets relevant to smaller 
enterprises. This intervention covers three 
main types: investment subsidy schemes, 
loan subsidy schemes and loan facilities, 
including loan guarantees. This article fo-
cuses on credit subsidization schemes and 
loan guarantees, provided by specially 
formed organizations – credit and loan 
funds.
Poland is an example of developing a 
well-functioning and sustainable system of 
loan and guarantee funds. Actors managed 
to build a stable network. This network will 
face a new challenge as European Union 
will probably limit the amount of money 
spent on financial aid for SMEs in the new 
financial perspective due to the Brexit 
(Levarlet et al., 2018).
The article aims to answer the primary 
research question - How were the actors 
mobilized to form a network for promoting 
microfinancing system in a transforming 
country? For this case study, we employ the 
actor-network theory (ANT) as a lens and 
as an interpretation tool. Two detailed re-
search questions guide this study:
Q1. Who are the focal actors that have 
been successfully translated into a network 
of loan and guarantee funds?
Q2. How the process of translation went 
through? 
The rest of the article is organized as fol-
lows. The second section reviews the previ-
ous studies that investigated the functioning 
microfinancing funds (loan and guarantee 
funds). The third section discusses the Actor 
Network Theory and describes the research 
methods. The fourth section examines and 
analyses the development of loan and guar-
antee funds network from an ANT perspec-
tive. The last section presents the conclusion 
and implications for future research.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
In many countries, financial instruments 
programs aimed at closing the capital gap 
for SMEs are distributed by governmen-
tal agencies or bank institutions. There are 
two main types of such programs: subsi-
dized loans and guarantees schemes. Both 
of them should foster entrepreneurship, in-
crease the number of start-ups, speed-up 
SMEs growth and change banks’ attitude to 
lending. The institutions granting the loans 
should concentrate more on consumer rela-
tions than on financial analysis of the com-
pany and assets valuation (Cowling, 1998, 
p. 157). For example, in the UK, loans 
for SMEs are co-financed by the govern-
ment, but distributed by private organiza-
tions, such as Black Country Reinvestment 
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Society1, Business Enterprise Fund2,  
Prince’s Trust and Let’s Do Business (South 
East) Group Limited. Under the program 
called British Business Bank, in the years 
2009-2014, over 21 thousand loans for 
SMEs worth £2,192,000, secured by gov-
ernment guarantees were granted. The av-
erage loan secured through this program 
amounted to £102,100 during this period. 
Subsidized loans programs and espe-
cially loan funds seem to be less popu-
lar than guarantee schemes. In most 
countries where subsidized loans pro-
grams operate, they are offered by state-
owned banks or other state-controlled 
entities. Such organizations are Austria 
Wirtschaftsservice GmbH (AWS) and 
Österreichische Hotel und Tourismusbank 
GmbH (ÖHT) in Austria, Czech Moravian 
Guarantee and Development Bank, the 
Czech Export Bank and Export Guarantee 
and Insurance Corporation in Czech 
Republic, Vaekstfonden- Danish Growth 
Fund in Denmark, Banque Publique 
d’Investissement (Bpifrance) in France, 
Hungarian Development Bank- in Hungary 
ABN Amro, BNG, ING, Rabobank, Caixa 
Geral de Depósitos S.A. (CGD), Slovak 
Business Agency in Slovak Republic, etc. 
In some countries, subsidized loans are pro-
vided by a not-for-profit organization sup-
ported by banks, including Microfinance 
Ireland in Ireland and Qredits in the 
Netherlands. A relatively bigger number of 
organizations exist in Hungary and Poland. 
In Hungary, there are 22 microfinance or-
ganizations - controlled by a The Hungarian 
Foundation for Enterprise Promotion. All 
these entities are members of the Hungarian 
Microfinance Network.
1 http://bcrs.org.uk/loan-process/ accessed: 15 May 
2015
2 http://www.befund.org/about-us/ accessed: 15 May 
2015
An example of a failure lending scheme 
is Tunisia case described by Bechri et al. 
(2001). This case shows how actors in the 
network can cause failure. Three main ac-
tors participated in the development of 
the FORPRODI program created in 1974: 
banks, SMEs and state-owned credit guar-
antee scheme (FNG). In the early 1990s, the 
program was found to be unsatisfactory and 
was terminated. All three actors had their 
role in the failure of the sustainable lending 
system for SMEs. 
Banks were the organizations supposed 
to grant the loans to SMEs. Private banks 
were rarely interested in the program as fi-
nancial benefits (subsidy to interest) were 
low and there was a relatively high share of 
credit risk (not all risk was covered FNG). 
Consequently, most of the banks were state-
owned commercial banks. Lack of compe-
tition among banks, unionization of bank 
employees led to a relatively low level of 
skills and engagement of bank officers par-
ticipating in the program. It resulted in very 
lengthy procedures of loan approvals - up 
to 15 months for a FOPRODI project to 
reach the production stage (Bechri 2001 p. 
302). Moreover, the banks rarely undertook 
thorough screening and monitoring of their 
loans. 
SMEs were the beneficiaries of the sub-
sidy in the FOPRODI projects. FOPRODI 
entrepreneur could have got a lower inter-
est rate than they would under market con-
ditions. An entrepreneur could benefit from 
a long-term loan at start-up for up to 70% 
of the initial capital of the firm, vastly out-
weighing the entrepreneur’s contribution 
that could be as small as 10% of the initial 
capital. It meant a low possible loss for a 
SME. Both reasons created an incentive for 
fraud, embezzlement, and waste. Some of 
them decided to use the money from sub-
sidized loans for the purchase of personal 
Journal of Contemporary Management Issues
42
use items (like cars and houses) rather than 
for the declared use. Moreover, long wait-
ing time lead also to the failure of some 
financed projects due to the changes in the 
economic environment. 
The third actor was Tunisia’s Credit 
Guarantee System “Fonds National de 
Garantie” (FNG), created in 1981. FNG 
received its funds from a flat rate charge of 
1% of all FOPRODI-supported loans. In the 
first period until 1993 its secretariat was lo-
cated within the central bank. It was a tiny 
unit lacking technical and organizational 
resources. As such, it was unable to appro-
priately appraise the claims coming from 
banks.
Guarantee funds and schemes3 are cre-
ated in many countries to help small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to obtain 
bank loans and increase their creditwor-
thiness. They are considered a better tool 
than loans because the guarantees allow 
using the private capital (bank loans) thus 
overcoming the obstacles for the financing, 
such as the lack of collaterals and high risk 
of bankruptcy of small and young compa-
nies. Such schemes and funds are opera-
tional throughout South America, Europe, 
Southeast Asia, and North America, as de-
scribed by Llisterri (1997). Guarantee funds 
provide guarantees for banks, taking into 
account the risk of insolvency of the com-
pany requesting the loan (Sanneris, 2015). 
Guarantee funds, apart from the guaran-
tees, support their customers in filling in 
the documents related to obtaining a loan 
and organize additional training. Guarantee 
funds taking over part of the credit risk of-
ten decide to monitor the borrower, which 
3 In some countries, such as Poland, the schemes are 
realized by specialized organizations - guarantee 
funds. Moreover, one fund may offer few schemes. 
In other countries, such as the UK, the same 
schemes are offered by varius organizations, 
including commercial banks and specialized NGOs.
is an added benefit for banks to work with 
these funds. However, the role of guar-
antee funds is to limit market imperfec-
tions manifested in the increase in the cost 
of capital for small and young companies 
(Garcia- Tabuenca & Crespo-Espert, 2010). 
However, subsidised guarantees and loans 
do not reduce financing costs, until SMEs 
reach the level of development of other 
companies (Garcia- Tabuenca & Crespo-
Espert, 2010, p. 114). The best effects of 
guarantee funds are visible in less devel-
oped regions (Armstrong et al., 2014) and 
with weaker companies (Garcia-Tabuenca, 
2008; Crespo-Espert, 2010).
Guarantee schemes are organized in two 
different ways: mutual guarantee schemes 
or public guarantee programs. The former 
is based on the capital, paid in by members 
of the guarantee fund, who can then benefit 
from the guarantees of the fund (Columba, 
Gambacorta, & Mistrulli, 2009). Mutual 
guarantee funds are developed in coun-
tries with a long tradition of guild or craft 
and with sectorial organizations facing 
economic problems (Camino & Cardone, 
1999), such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Luxemburg, Italy, Portugal, Spain, 
and Switzerland. Other countries created 
guarantee schemes funded with public mon-
ey, typically EU funds, including Greece, 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and 
Poland. Some researchers underline that pri-
vate capital and a private share in the risk de-
crease the loan losses; however, others claim 
that when a decision is left to government 
employees, less attention may be paid to fair 
risk assessment (Beck, Klapper, & Mendoza, 
2010).
Guarantee funds in different countries 
adopt different business models (Beck at 
al., 2010). Their organisational structures, 
risk assessment and management meth-
ods, valuation mechanisms and the role of 
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the private and public sectors differ. Older 
funds and guarantee schemes are more 
likely to be financed by the government 
and managed by governmental organisa-
tions, as well as having higher loan losses. 
Therefore, their efficiency and financial sta-
bility play a key role in the evaluation of 
the whole support system for SMEs.
In most countries, loans and guarantees 
are granted by different institutions. They 
work independently and follow diversified 
rules. In Poland, the guarantee and loan 
schemes were organized in the same period, 
use the same sources of financing and are 
run by the same type of institutions. Even 
the same number of guarantee and loan 
granting institutions was to be created. The 
case of Poland shows how actors were mo-
bilized to form a network for promoting the 
microfinancing system, obstacles they en-
countered and how they succeeded in reach-
ing their goals. 
3. THEORY FRAMEWORK AND 
METHODOLOGY
Actor-network theory (hereafter referred 
to as “ANT”) is rooted in sociological re-
search conducted during the 1970s. ANT 
was initially developed by Bruno Latour, 
Michael Callon and John Law as a method 
to understand the social construction of sci-
ence (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987). ANT is a 
material-semiotic method, mapping relations 
that are simultaneously material - between 
things and semiotic between concepts. ANT 
was utilized in a wide range of disciplines in-
cluding economics (Bledin and Shewmake, 
2004, Callon and Muniesa, 2005), organiza-
tional studies (Hull, 1999) and accounting 
(Lowe 2001, Pipan and Czarniawska, 2010). 
ANT assumes that society is made up of as-
sociations between actors. The actors are de-
fined by their place within the network and 
their relationship with other actors. This as-
sumption enables the researcher to ignore 
divisions within society that may be consid-
ered to be foundational and to explore how 
the networks grow and what material prac-
tices are brought to bear (Law, 2007).
Unlike Social Network Theory (SNT) 
that regards network as “a structure,” ANT 
views network as “dynamic process.” 
Actors in ANT are widely understood. 
They include individuals, but also groups, 
texts, technical artefacts, organizations, 
animals. Actors considered within the net-
work act or make a difference within the 
network (Lowe, 2001). These networks 
change in an ongoing process of creating 
and remaking. It focuses on how networks 
of actors form, hold together, and fall apart 
(Pipan and Czarniawska, 2010; Callon, 
1986). However, it does not attempt to ex-
plore why a network exists (Latour, 1987). 
Instead, ANT aims to explain how hetero-
geneous actors perform to form networks. 
Consequently, actors are not structured 
into any system but act as a coordinated 
network. ANT does not account for pre-ex-
isting structures like social network theory 
(SNT).
Callon (1985) states that ANT is based 
on three main principles: agnosticism, gen-
eralized symmetry, and free association. 
Agnosticism means impartiality between 
actors engaged in controversy and absten-
tion from censoring the actors when they 
speak about themselves or the social envi-
ronment. Generalized symmetry is the com-
mitment to explain conflicting viewpoints 
in the same terms and treatment of both 
human and non-human actors in the same 
way. The free association assumes the aban-
donment of all a priori distinctions between 
the natural and the social. The use of the 
principles occurred to be hard even for the 
creators of ANT. Collins and Yearley (1992) 
Journal of Contemporary Management Issues
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were critical about Callon’s application of 
the generalized symmetry principle in the 
case of non-human actors (scallops).  
Translation is a focal element of ANT 
(Callon, 1986). Translation is the process 
during which innovators attempt to create 
a central network in which all the actors 
agree that the system is worth building and 
defending. Callon (1986) identified four 
phases (originally called four moments) 
in the translation: problematization, inter-
essement, enrolment, and mobilization. 
During the first phase, problematization, 
the primary actor attempts to identify the 
problem, the knowledge that is required, 
and what actors are needed within the net-
work to achieve their goal. Interessement 
is the second phase of translation. During 
this phase, primary actors try to build the 
system. They conduct negotiations regard-
ing the roles they may play within the net-
work.  Negotiations lead to enrolment. In 
this third phase, actors accept the charac-
ters they have been given and enrol in the 
system. Mobilization then occurs, as others 
external to the network (allies) decide to 
support it. Actors are persuaded that their 
interests are aligned with those of the focal 
actor, thereby avoiding betrayal; this allows 
the network to be maintained. This process 
is not unproblematic. Controversy may un-
subscribe the actors or remove the support 
of the external allies – such acts are often 
perceived as treasons (Callon, 1986).
The original methodical approach used 
in ANT is based on the rule: follow the ac-
tors. The primary sources of data in ANT 
are interviews and ethnographic research; 
the latter uses texts and communications 
from all forms of media. 
We used the focus research, in-depth 
interviews, and analysis of documents as 
sources in our study. Focus meeting was held 
on 23.11.2018. It lasted 2.5 hours. Seven 
people from 7 organization participated 
(please see Appendix 1). It started with a 
summary of statistical analysis on the perfor-
mance of loan and guarantee funds. Next, the 
following questions were asked:
1. How were the loan and guarantee 
funds created?
2. How did they change over the years?
3. What were the main problems dur-
ing the loan and guarantee fund’s 
creation process?
4. What affects the performance of the 
loan and guarantee funds?
5. What are the barriers in the devel-
opment of the loan and guarantee 
funds?
6. Will the guarantee funds be able to 
continue their activity?
The focus meeting was video recorded 
and then transcribed. As the topic of net-
work creation was not fully covered by an-
swers during the focus meeting, we decided 
to conduct two additional interviews with 
two focus participants. The first in-depth 
interview was face to face meeting in the 
headquarters of the loan fund. It lasted three 
and a half hours. The second was a phone 
interview. It lasted one and half hour. Both 
interviews were recorded and transcribed 
(please see Appendix 2).
We also used the information from re-
ports of National Association of Guarantee 
Funds, Polish Association of Loan Funds 
for the years 2008-2017 and information in 
reports of the State on public guarantees in 
Poland (Information on guarantees, 2017) 
for the years 1999-2017 and interviews 
published in newspapers.
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4. TRANSLATION PROCESS
4.1. The problematization (1988-
1990)
The phase of problematization lasted 
in the period 1988-1990. At the end of the 
1980s, it was noticed that in Poland a cen-
trally planned system based on public own-
ership is inefficient. At the end of the com-
munist system in Poland, the banking system 
in the country was monopolized, obsolete 
and inefficient. At that time, there was a cen-
tral bank and Poland, there were about 1500 
local cooperative banks, but none of them 
was able to carry out efficient lending on a 
bigger scale. The problem was also a grow-
ing inflation, which in 1990 reached 600 per 
cent. The communist government attempted 
to reform it, among other methods, by adopt-
ing the act on economic activity, prepared in 
1988. The act legalized private business ac-
tivities. It operated on the principles of “what 
is not forbidden is allowed” and “let it act” 
(Kaliński 2015). Another reforming activity 
was the separation of banks from the central 
bank structures (Narodowy Bank Polski).
The reforms accelerated after the loss 
of power of the communist party. The new 
government adopted a plan aimed at sta-
bilizing the macroeconomic situation (pri-
marily to reduce inflation) and transforming 
it from a centrally controlled economy to a 
market one. This plan, consisting of 11 acts, 
was called the Balcerowicz’s plan. The goal 
of the plan was to reduce the budget deficit 
and to slow down the money supply growth. 
It embraced a radical reduction of subsidies, 
especially for energy carriers, drastically in-
creasing the price of coal, gas, and electricity 
by three to four times. To encourage saving 
in the national currency, the interest rate on 
bank deposits was increased. It entailed a 
rise in credit costs - interest rate reached 38-
46%. Market-based pricing for 90% of the 
prices was allowed (Kaliński 2005).
The aim of reforms was also privatiza-
tion and promotion of entrepreneurship. 
Entrepreneurship was also partly enforced by 
the side effects of reforms - the collapse of 
large state-owned enterprises, which led to 
the increase in unemployment and the gener-
al lack of certain goods and services. A num-
ber of registered unemployed persons rose 
from 04 to 1.1 million in this period.
At the same time, the changes concerned 
the banking sector. The law on the National 
Bank of Poland and the Banking Law were 
passed. Based on them, banking supervision 
institutions and nine state-owned universal 
banks were established. Those banks took 
over deposit and loan activities from the cen-
tral bank (Appezeller 2002).
The aim of reforms was also privati-
zation and entrepreneurship promotion. 
Entrepreneurship was also partly forced by 
the side effects of reforms - the collapse of 
some large state-owned enterprises and the 
increase in unemployment and the lack of 
many goods and services on the market. The 
number of enterprises grew from less than 
600 thousand in 1988 to over 1.26 million in 
1990.
At the beginning of the transformation of 
Polish economy, loans for entrepreneurs or 
individuals were difficult to access and very 
expensive. Bank credits were either unavail-
able or they could be obtained with very 
high interest rates for most of the entrepre-
neurs. The lack of rules for assessing credit-
worthiness, high inflation, and negative ex-
periences of entrepreneurs in the early 1990s 
(interest rates on loans exceeding 100%) 
resulted in their reluctance to use debt to fi-
nance investment plans. It was obvious that 
economic development depends on small 
business. Therefore, the goal to increase 
the number of small businesses in Poland 
4 There were no registered unemployed in centrally 
planned system. However, hidden unemployment 
existed.
Journal of Contemporary Management Issues
46
became one of the most important targets 
for the Polish government. The Interviewee 
1 mentioned one of the more serious cases 
where a director of one of the cooperative 
banks granted several dozen loans for the 
mortgage of the same property. The dishon-
esty of some bank employees has led to the 
bankruptcy of cooperative banks, and a sense 
of injustice spread among entrepreneurs. The 
directors of local units made decisions on 
granting loans, often to their acquaintances, 
for the same collaterals.
Three focal actors were active in the first 
phase of the translation process: entrepre-
neurs, Polish and foreign government institu-
tions, and banks. 
The first focal actor were entrepreneurs 
wanting to start and develop their businesses, 
lacking capital. The problem were high inter-
est rates and the reluctance of banks to grant 
loans to entrepreneurs they did not know. 
The second focal actor were Polish 
banks, which started to operate under mar-
ket conditions and serve their customers 
that way. The banks wanted to earn money, 
but before that, they had to learn how their 
activity should be organized in a free mar-
ket economy. The problems were caused by 
other actors – bank employees who wanted 
to fulfil their interests, especially to get as 
much money as possible for themselves. 
They were not interested in the efficiency of 
the banks and the welfare of the country. 
The third focal actor were the Polish 
and foreign government institutions, which 
wanted to develop a free market economy in 
Poland.  
4.2. Interessment (1991-1992)
Until 1992, as a result of liberal licens-
ing policy, 70 commercial banks were es-
tablished in Poland. Those banks were set 
up by both private, municipal and the state 
investors. State administration units created 
banks for the implementation of socio-eco-
nomic goals.  Municipal and communal units 
established banks aimed at financing enter-
prises from selected economy sectors or to 
support the development of a given region. 
In both cases, however, these banks were 
small, and not efficient in comparison to big 
universal commercial banks. In the period 
from 1990 to the first half of 1992 foreign in-
vestors established new banks (7 joint-stock 
companies with a majority share of foreign 
capital and three branches of foreign banks) 
(Appenzeler 1992). At the same time, some 
commercial banks started to increase their 
capital by IPOs and subsequent issues of 
shares. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, Polish 
banks needed the know-how, employees, 
capital, technology, infrastructure. Bank 
employees started to feel the pressure of the 
society, investors, government. In 1990, in 
Poland, the National Bank of Poland restored 
the traditional functions of the central bank. 
At the second level were over 1700 banks 
representing various forms of ownership, 
including: state banks, state-cooperative 
banks, state banks in the form of joint stock 
companies, state banks with private capi-
tal participation, banks with foreign capital 
participation and cooperative banks. It was 
obvious that something had to be changed. 
Very small banks did not have enough capi-
tal to issue the loans and satisfy local capital 
needs. “That time every big village had its 
cooperative bank” stated President of Polish 
Banks Association.
Banking was transforming and becom-
ing more professional. The branches of 
foreign banks used procedures applied in 
countries with a developed market econo-
my. Bank employees went through exten-
sive training. Banks implemented new cred-
itworthiness assessment procedures which 
cut off access to capital for many small 
enterprises. Banks began to cooperate. In 
1991 the Polish Banks Association was set 
up. Soon after, central registry of credit 
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history was activated in order to prevent 
banks from frauds and the issue of loans 
with weak collaterals.
Opening a business was relatively 
easy. Because everything was lacking and 
there was not much competition, many 
companies were successful. According to 
Interviewee 2, the 1990s were times when 
“whatever the entrepreneur touched, it was 
working.” The important problem that had 
to be overcome was access to capital. The 
problems were: lack of experience, lack of 
specific competencies and, to a large extent, 
lack of access to capital. Because of the 
dominant public ownership in the previous 
economic system, citizens did not have as-
sets that could serve as collaterals for loans. 
At the beginning of the transformation pe-
riod, inflation was high. It caused liquidity 
problems and discouraged savings. 
The problems described above were 
noticed by public institutions, including 
the Polish Government, the World Bank, 
European Community, U. S. Congress. The 
proposed solution of the credit gap prob-
lem was the creation of loan and guarantee 
schemes in Poland. This task was assigned to 
organizations, created by people that had ex-
perience as entrepreneurs or bank employees 
(managers of loan funds). They were asked 
to set up associations that were to run loan 
funds for people wanting to start or develop 
their businesses. Public institutions were in-
terested in creating Polish small business, 
while managers of funds were interested in 
fulfilling their personal goals (gaining new 
income source and career development pos-
sibility). One of the problems that had to be 
eliminated was the willingness of the candi-
dates for fund managers to get rich fast by 
being involved in embezzlement. Each fund 
received start-up capital, which could be 
used for administrative activities, purchase of 
materials and equipment. This capital could 
have been used effectively or misappropri-
ated. The task to create organizations to grant 
loans and guarantees was entrusted to region-
al public sector units, which directed it. The 
CEO selection process was successful. Most 
of the selected persons created funds, found 
customers, granted loans or guarantees; the 
cases of lost funds were relatively rare (10% 
default rate). Some of them manage funds to 
this day.
Another problem to overcome was the 
reluctance of entrepreneurs to indebtedness. 
Even today entrepreneurs believe that eq-
uity is the best source of financing. It is dif-
ficult to convince them that the risk of bank-
ruptcy, in the case of funding from external 
sources is lower than in case of running out 
of their capital.
Figure 1. Elements of a sociology of translation
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The main goal of all the actors was to 
create a sustainable market economy in 
Poland that all the actors wanted to profit 
from in the long term. To reach the goal, 
all obstacles presented in Figure 1 had to 
be overcome and goals of particular actors 
fulfilled. The success of the sustainable net-
work depended on all actors, ability to co-
operate. This ability was contingent on mu-
tual understanding and acceptance of differ-
ent objectives of actors. They had to answer 
the question: what should be done and in 
what chronology to satisfy all the actors?
4.3. Enrolment (1993-2003)
During the enrolment phase, most of 
the state banks were privatized, and the ma-
jority of their share packages were sold to 
foreign investors. Other essential processes 
in the banking sector in the analyzed pe-
riod were consolidation, informatization, 
and centralization. Consolidation included 
mergers, takeovers and even bankruptcies 
of some banks. Informatisation meant the 
implementation of new, more sophisticat-
ed IT systems and further improvement of 
creditworthiness assessment. It was con-
nected with centralization, in which more 
and more decisions (including credit deci-
sions) were made at the headquarters of 
banks. All these processes translated into 
a more prudent lending policy and further 
impediments to access to loans, especially 
for small and medium-sized enterprises. At 
this stage, the guarantee started to be used 
as financial instruments securing the loans 
granted. Banks began to accept this type 
of collaterals. In 1998 the Monetary Policy 
Council was created for the purpose of set-
ting the reference rates for all banks and 
bringing the interest rates to  normality. 
Unemployment in Poland during this 
stage remained relatively high (it ranged 
from 10 to 20 per cent). The reason was the 
liquidation of big state-owned enterprises, 
such as Ursus in 1993 (producing equip-
ment for the agriculture industry) or 
Stocznia Gdańska in 1996 (shipyard in 
Gdansk). People who lost their jobs of-
ten decided to set up their businesses. The 
problem was the access to capital for the 
new enterprises. Number of enterprises was 
growing at a fast pace. It reached 2.11 mil-
lion in 1995 and 3.18 million in 2000.
During this phase of translation, loan 
and guarantee funds started to appear as ac-
tors, being a result of the policy of Polish 
government, World Bank, European Union, 
U. S. Congress, Bank Gospodarstwa 
Krajowego (BGK). First loan funds were 
established in Poland in 1992 and guarantee 
funds in 1994. The sources of financing in 
the creation of the funds were the following 
programs:
a. Small Business Development Project 
TOR#10.  The program had two edi-
tions – the first in 1993 and the second 
in 1995. The cost of TOR#10 (Small 
Business Development Project) was 
covered 60% by the World Bank, and 
the state budget financed the remaining 
40 %. The money came form 74 public 
institutions, including 34 loan funds and 
31 business incubators (Matusiak et al., 
2005). Most of them operate until today. 
More than 50% of the institutions op-
erated in regions with the highest level 
of unemployment and almost half of 
them were active in small towns (<50 
thousand inhabitants) and villages. The 
value of the program was nearly EUR 7 
mln5. 
b. Polish-American Enterprise Fund. In 
1989, the U. S. Congress decided to es-
tablish the Polish-American Enterprise 
Fund (PAFP), whose mission was to 
support the development of the market 
5 1 EUR= 4,7 PLN for the day 30.12.2003
49
Management, Vol. 24, 2019, No.2, pp. 39-61
H. Waniak-Michalak, J. Michalak: DEVELOPMENT OF A ...
economy in Poland (culture, education, 
local initiatives). After five years of op-
eration, PAFP extended the activity by 
granting micro-credits to entrepreneurs 
through the newly created organization 
– Micro Fund. The value of the program 
was almost EUR 11m. 
c. Canadian-Polish Enterprise Progra-
mme. The Canadian-Polish Enterprise 
Programme was carried out under the 
responsibility of the Canadian-Polish 
Enterprise Foundation since 1997. The 
tasks of the Canadian-Polish Enterprise 
Foundation have been taken over by 
the Polish Enterprise Foundation (PFP) 
based in Szczecin since 2003. The foun-
dation received from the Canadian gov-
ernment a non-refundable grant of EUR 
7 million. The funds let the Foundation 
provide financial support (guarantees 
and loans) to more than 1,500 small 
and medium-sized enterprises and to 
train 18,000 entrepreneurs. Moreover, 
in 2001 PFP used the money to estab-
lish the guarantee found, POLFUND, 
which is now one of the largest guaran-
tee funds in Poland6. The value of the 
support provided by the Foundation was 
EUR 46 mln in the years 1997-2003, so 
the multiplier effect was 6.7.
D. PHARE (Poland and Hungary: 
Assistance for Restructuring their 
Economies)  was a programme of 
the European Commission created in 
1989 to provide financial support to 
countries which were candidates for 
European Union accession. Under the 
Local Initiatives Programme (Polska 
Iniciatywa Lokalna - PIL) financed 
with these funds, the first guarantee 




funds appeared in Poland at the begin-
ning of the 1990s. In the years 1990-
2003, the aid to Poland amounted to 
approximately EUR 3.9 billion. Part of 
the PHARE funds was used to create 
guarantee funds. In the years 1994-2003 
eight guarantee funds were active. Until 
2018, five of them still operate. Each 
fund received EUR 150-300 thousand 
(Gajewski et al., 2000). The program 
was continued until 2007. In 2016 the 
capital of the five guarantee funds was 
of a value EUR 7,5 million and the val-
ue of guarantees issued during 20 years 
of their activity was EUR 41 million.
e. Polish-British Program of Entrepre-
neurship Development. In 1994 the 
program started to support the develop-
ment of small and medium enterprises 
in two regions of eastern Poland. Within 
the program two guarantee funds were 
created. Initially, money for the function-
ing of the credit guarantee funds was on 
an account in the United Kingdom. This 
increased bureaucracy and significantly 
prolonged the process of granting the 
guarantees. It was not until a few years 
later that the UK Government agreed to 
transfer these funds to the accounts of 
credit fund institutions, which greatly 
facilitated the development of their ac-
tivities. The guarantee funds founded 
with the money of the British govern-
ment turned out to be the most success-
ful. Their capital on the last day of 2016 
was EUR 29 million and the value of all 
granted guarantees for 20 years EUR 117 
million.
In seven years since the start of the pro-
gram, the loan funds granted loans in the 
value of EUR 203 million with the capital 
of EUR 80 mln. The guarantee funds man-
aged to give guarantees of an amount EUR 
160 million, and absorb approximately 
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EUR 228 mln of loans for small and me-
dium enterprises. 
In 1994 the Guarantee Fund for Small 
and Medium Enterprises in BGK was set 
up by the Polish government with the capi-
tal of 45 million PLN (almost 18.5 million 
USD7). The Guarantee Fund for Small and 
Medium Enterprises had easier start than 
other regional organizations providing loans 
and guarantees. Firstly, BGK as a bank-
ing institution supported by the state had 
a better negotiating position than regional 
guarantee and loan funds. Secondly, BGK, 
established in 1924, and reactivated in 
1989 had the infrastructure, employees, and 
knowledge of the financial market. 
The idea of the government was to 
leave the task of granting big guaran-
tees to the Guarantee Fund for Small and 
Medium Enterprises and small guaran-
tees to local and regional guarantee funds. 
This way, the aim of the Polish govern-
ment was a creation of the network of lo-
cal and regional guarantee funds with one 
central guarantee fund. Therefore, in 1997 
the Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium 
Enterprises was changed into National 
Credit Guarantee Fund that could provide 
guarantees up to EUR 1.5 million not only 
to SMEs but also large enterprises and pub-
lic entities.  
In the creation of the loan and guar-
antee schemes in Poland, the experience 
of the World Bank in the development of 
similar schemes in other countries of Asia 
or Africa was used (Matusiak et al., 2005). 
In the case of  #TOR 10 program, starting 
capital was treated as a non-returnable sub-
sidy in the development of SMEs in Poland. 
Money was supposed to be lost after a few 
years. Unexpectedly, capital is used by 
some funds even today.
7 According to exchange rate on 29.12.1994
At the same time, fund employees had 
to gain experience, sometimes learning 
from mistakes. The first loan granted by 
the National Association for the Support of 
Entrepreneurship was not returned regular-
ly. The investment failed, and money had 
to be executed in a lengthy process. The 
bad experience of loan funds forced their 
managers to develop procedures and adopt 
rules for assessing creditworthiness. As the 
first loans were limited to $20,000, loan 
funds financed mainly the establishment 
of businesses in trade or service sectors. 
The amount they could have granted was 
not sufficient to set up a production activ-
ity. However, as the participants of the fo-
cus research said: “the loan funds were to 
be for entrepreneurs in the kindergarten 
(that’s why the amount of the loan was so 
small) and allow them to go to the ‘school’ 
of financing under market conditions.”
In the 1990s, the guarantee funds in 
Poland received money for founding capi-
tal, which they could deposit in banks 
at high interest rates. From the interest 
earned on deposits, the funds could finance 
additional administrative needs. Moreover, 
the money from the initial capital was 
used to cover salary costs, sometimes very 
high for the members of the management 
board. The low capital endowment caused 
the bankruptcy of such funds in a short 
period and a lack of results, as banks did 
not treat the funds with little capital as se-
rious business partners. The first guarantee 
funds created in the 1990s had to face the 
attempts of some people to get rich quick-
ly, the reluctance of bankers and the lack 
of strategy. According to the Interviewee 
2: “some of the funds did not achieve good 
results at that time and today, because 
they are waiting for a customer who does 
not know about them and does not come to 
them.”
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Loan and guarantee funds had to face 
several major obstacles to be successful. 
First was the access to skilled people who 
were able to find customers and evaluate 
whether they will be able to repay the loans. 
Most funds solved this problem by employ-
ing people with at least some experience in 
the banking sector. The second obstacle was 
gaining the trust of entrepreneurs and learn-
ing to cooperate with them. As Interviewee 
1 stated. The beginnings were difficult. First, 
people, entrepreneurs had to believe that this 
was not a scam. Later they had to learn how 
to estimate their investment needs — this re-
quired direct discussions with customers and 
the development of procedures. Entrepreneurs’ 
trust was critical as recommendations from 
satisfied customers were the primary source 
of gaining new customers and developing 
a network of contacts. The third obstacle in 
the case of guarantee funds was finding bank 
partners for their guarantees. This problem 
was also mainly solved by employees who 
worked previously in banks. They were able 
to find banks through their former colleagues 
who still worked in banks.
Some of the regional loan and guar-
antees collapsed. The initial capital of the 
funds was too small for the creation of the 
lines of loans (less than $125 thousand) 
and to build the client base, or too small 
for guarantee funds to build the relation-
ship with banks. Banks as the focal actors 
of the translation aimed at the creation of 
an efficient banking system. To do this, they 
needed to exclude or minimalize the frauds 
in banks and build trust among investors 
and borrowers.  If the guarantee fund had 
a small capital, no experience in operating 
and a limited number of employed special-
ists, the chance for the cooperation of the 
bank and the guarantee funds was little.
Moreover, the Interviewee 1 stated that 
the managers of the guarantee and loan 
funds, who decided to participate in the cre-
ation of the loan-guarantee system only to 
get rich fast and easy, noticed quickly that 
the strategy is short-term. Other managers, 
whose loan and guarantee funds survived 
realized that it is better to manage the fund 
effectively, because the second chance for 
such a stable and a prominent position may 
not appear so soon.  Some regional loan and 
guarantee funds in Poland also collapsed as 
a result of poor management.
Loan and guarantee funds were created 
as NGOs, whose main goal was support 
of SMEs in closing their capital gap. They 
were supposed to cooperate, not compete. 
During the enrolment phase, loan and guar-
antee funds started to cooperate in a more 
organized manner. National Association 
of Guarantee Funds was initiated in 1996 
and Polish Association of Loan Funds was 
set up in 2002. These associations aimed to 
promote guarantee and loan funds and or-
ganize experience exchange among organi-
zations supporting business development.
4.4. Mobilization (2004-today) 8
The mobilization phase starts in 2004 
with Poland’s accession to the EU. As a re-
sult of the accession, Polish entrepreneurs 
and loan and guarantee funds gained new 
sources of financing and hope for positive 
changes. Next important event occurred in 
2009 when Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego 
(BGK) became an independent institution 
that could issue the guarantees in its name 
and in the name of the State Treasury. That 
year the National Credit Guarantee Fund was 
liquidated, and the BGK became the owner 
of the money from the fund.  CEOs of re-
gional guarantee funds perceive it as their 
rival who “changed sides”. According to 
them, BGK was supposed to support local 
8 The information in the part 4.4 of this paper is based 
on data from the focus research unless otherwise 
stated.
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and regional funds and not replace them. 
They also indicated that BGK could not be 
efficient in lending operations, as the region-
al funds know better the problems of busi-
ness owners in the region than the central 
organization. 
The competitive relation with BGK 
could be a little exaggerated. To decrease 
the competition between BGK and regional 
funds, the SMEs that want to use a guaran-
tee directly from BGK must have the bank 
account in BGK for six months before they 
apply for such guarantee. Consequently, in-
dividual agreements of BGK with enterpris-
es became rare. In 2017 BGK issued only 
portfolio guarantees and none of the indi-
vidual guarantees. Therefore, the competi-
tion of BGK for regional guarantee funds in 
Poland might be smaller than it seems to be 
for CEOs of the guarantee funds. Moreover, 
currently, BGK is a shareholder of 16, out 
of 50 regional guarantee funds in Poland, so 
it simultaneously plays the role of rival and 
supporter of regional guarantee funds. 
In the mobilization phase, loan and 
guarantee funds received additional financ-
ing from EU regional development pro-
grams, but the demand for them increased. 
They were obliged to reach particular re-
sults. Otherwise, they had to pay penalties. 
The managers of these funds had to change 
their business models. As the President of 
the National Association for the Support 
of Entrepreneurship points out, the ba-
sis for high efficiency of the fund was and 
still is to avoid lost loans. The National 
Fund of the Association for the Support 
of Entrepreneurship did not lose a single 
loan during its 23 years of activity. At first, 
the funds had to elaborate on the proce-
dures and rules for issuing loans or guar-
antees. However, to maintain the result 
as The National Fund of the Association 
for the Support of Entrepreneurship, the 
procedures and methods for assessing cred-
itworthiness are not sufficient. “Nothing 
can replace a conversation with an entre-
preneur, face to face,” says the President of 
this association. Regional loan and guaran-
tee funds know their clients and can assess 
the project better than banks, from objective 
and subjective points of view. 
Initially, guarantee funds granted only 
loan guarantees. Currently, the funds guar-
antee various financial instruments: tender 
deposits, loans, factoring, leasing, etc, be-
cause the needs of entrepreneurs changed. 
15-20 years ago the first money was given 
by local and regional governments. The 
director of the guarantee fund (Fundusz 
Rozwoju I Promocji Województwa 
Wielkopolskiego) was asked about the suc-
cess of his fund. He said: "The Fund has 
the equity of approximately PLN 35 mil-
lion, and we granted guarantees of almost 
PLN 900 million, and with the help of these 
guarantees the entrepreneurs obtained 
loans for approximately PLN 1.5 billion 
from banks. There is a saying, “you can’t 
see the washed dishes.” We see them only 
when the dirty ones start to accumulate in 
the kitchen. And then we realized that it is 
not as it should be because there has al-
ways been an order. We tend not to notice 
the correct, decent development. We have 
many customers who started their business 
from a small shop; today their business is 
a large chain of stores. Similarly, transport 
companies started with one, two cars; today 
they have a fleet of several dozen or even 
hundreds of vehicles”9.
Many loan and guarantee funds decided 
to run additional activities to cover their 
fixed costs: consulting services, rental of 
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office space, operating technological parks. 
Some of the organizations started to offer 
both: loans and guarantees. Previously, guar-
antee funds operated as an indirect support 
tool for entrepreneurs. If the client wanted to 
use the guarantee, the bank had to submit the 
application of the entrepreneur to the guar-
antee fund. Now, guarantee funds started to 
issue the guarantees directly to the business 
owners. Guarantee funds’ employees had to 
learn how to cooperate with entrepreneurs 
and communicate with them. Some of the 
guarantee funds created a call-center, and an 
account on Facebook and Twitter. 
Banks do not always have an interest in 
directing entrepreneurs to a particular guar-
antee fund, especially if they cooperate with 
several funds. They still require a stronger 
engagement of guarantee funds in the co-
operation, while loan funds are considered 
by banks as unfair competition, luckily on 
a small scale. The loan funds do not have to 
fulfil capital, accounting, reserve require-
ments for bank institutions and they receive 
the public support. 
Over time, the guarantee funds, which 
currently have the best capital multipli-
ers, started to introduce additional guaran-
tees, e. g. tender guarantees, thus respond-
ing to the expectations of entrepreneurs. 
One of the best guarantee funds in Poland 
- the Development and Promotion Fund of 
Wielkopolskie Voivodeship S. A. launched 
its call-centre, introduced a guarantee sales 
system directly to customers. The business 
model of guarantee funds began to change 
from direct to indirect support.
In the EU budget period for the years, 
2014-2020, funds for subsidized loans/guar-
antees are granted by a tender. Tenders are 
won by the organization that offers the low-
est cost of operations (compensation) level 
and experience in loan granting. In the ten-
ders participants are not only loan funds, 
but also other entities. Such entities that 
have revenues from other sources are often 
able to offer lower compensation that tradi-
tional loan funds.  They set up a consortium 
with a small guarantee fund to demonstrate 
experience in the tender. In subsequent ten-
ders, they may not need small fund to coop-
erate, because they can show experience in 
offering such instruments. Loan and guaran-
tee funds perceive it as unfair competition10. 
Tender procedure significantly extends the 
implementation period of instruments and 
this reduces the possible leverage (multi-
plier effect).
4.5. Betrayals
There is always a fear that one of the ac-
tors will betray the others and will decide to 
pursue its short-term goals instead of seek-
ing long-term benefits for all parties.
Meanwhile, three significant betrayals 
have arisen that have changed the mindset 
and woke up fears of directors of loan and 
guarantee funds that the future of the funds’ 
activities may be uncertain. 
The first betrayal perceived by loan and 
guarantee funds was committed by govern-
ment institutions. The institutions intro-
duced the necessity of participation of loan 
and guarantee funds in the tender when ap-
plying for funds from the EU in the budget 
period 2014-2020. Thus, a fund that can 
boast the best results can win a tender, forc-
ing other funds to collapse or seek another 
source of funding. The threat of job losses 
for fund employees may lead them to un-
fair competition and alliances with institu-
tions outside the network. Funds are start-
ing to steal business models, solutions and 
products (regulations, document templates) 
rather than share them.
10 Information from focus research organized by 
authors.
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As the perceived second betrayal, 
the new policy of Bank Gospodarstwa 
Krajowego (BGK) began to grant guar-
antees to small and medium-sized enter-
prises. Despite the current restrictions on 
granting individual guarantees, BGK is 
still treated by some of the guarantee funds 
as a competition and a threat to their activ-
ities. Representatives of regional guarantee 
funds believe that BGK steals their cus-
tomer and may cause guarantee funds to go 
bankrupt in the long run.
The third betrayal was committed 
by the manager of the biggest loan fund 
(Fundusz Mikro). In 2010, she managed to 
control 100% ownership in this organiza-
tion and transformed it into a bank. Before 
2010, the fund granted twice as many 
loans than all other loan funds in Poland. 
However, because the Fundusz Mikro usu-
ally granted loans below $ 2,000, the value 
of Fundusz Mikro’s loans in a value of all 
loans granted by loan funds in Poland did 
not exceed 16%. Fundusz Mikro special-
ized in granting small loans for all pur-
poses of small enterprises with minimum 
formalities. When Fundusz Mikro left loan 
funds system, the number of loan funds 
dropped dramatically (55%). As the pri-
vate bank, the Fundusz Mikro could not 
get grants and participate in the creation of 
the system support for SMEs any more. It 
still issues loans for SMEs, but with much 
higher interest rates, even higher than com-
mercial banks. Undoubtedly the network 
of loan funds became weaker without 
Fundusz Mikro.
Currently, according to the data of the 
National Association of Guarantee Funds, 
43 guarantee funds operated in Poland at 
the end of 2016. The total capitalization 
of guarantee funds in 2016 in Poland was 
EUR 248,5 million. According to the data 
of Polish Association of Loan Funds, 80 
loan funds operate (at the end of 2017) in 
Poland. The capital of loan funds also in-
creased in comparison to the initial value 
in 1990s, by 35 times, reaching 555 million 
EUR.  
To sum, the information obtained from 
focus research and interviews, the success 
of guarantee and loan schemes depends on 
people. The willingness to get rich can de-
stroy any program. It is about the people 
who create the support system to achieve 
the best possible results. They should also 
be held accountable for the results, and it 
should not be enough to say “we have done 
our best, but it is not our fault.”7 Table 1 
shows the process of mobilization of the 
system loan-guarantee in Poland as well as 
relations among actors. 
11 Opinion of the focus research participant.
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5. SUMMARY AND 
CONCLUSIONS
Credit rationing is a common problem 
in case of small firms. The problem is par-
ticularly important in countries that trans-
formed from a centrally planned system to 
a free-market economy. The article aims 
to answer the primary research question - 
“how actors were mobilized to form a net-
work for promoting microfinancing system 
in a transforming country?”. For this case 
study, we employed the actor-network the-
ory (ANT) as a lens and interpretation tool.
In many countries, financial instruments 
aimed at closing the capital gap (including 
subsidized loans and guarantees) for SMEs 
are distributed by governmental agencies or 
banks. However, in Poland, a specific net-
work of organizations, aimed at closing the 
capital gap, was created. It consists of four 
main actors: government institutions, funds, 
entrepreneurs, banks. The specificity of the 
Polish network is that most funds are non-
profit organizations.
The first circumstances for the creation 
of a guarantee and loan system in Poland 
appeared in the early 1990s. In the prob-
lematization phase, a significant amount of 
SMEs was established. At the same time, 
the first commercial banks were created. 
The banking system was inefficient, and 
most entrepreneurs lacked capital. Public 
institutions noticed the need to organize 
a system, facilitating access to capital by 
SMEs. Interessement period was critical 
for the creation of the network. The process 
of the creation of first loan and guarantee 
funds was started in this period. All four ac-
tors had to develop trust relations between 
them. Public institutions had to trust fund 
managers that they will not embezzle funds. 
Entrepreneurs had to trust funds that they 
will provide a reliable source of financing. 
Funds had to believe entrepreneurs that 
their business will be successful and that 
they will repay their loans and credits (in 
case of guarantee funds). Banks had to trust 
guarantee funds that they will cover possi-
ble losses. In the enrolment period loan and 
guarantee funds developed their operations 
and increased their scale of operations. 
Some of them collapsed quickly, but most 
of them were successful.  
Mobilization phase after joining the EU 
created new possibilities for enterprises 
and funds due to better access to EU funds. 
However, some betrayals in the network 
occur. The first betrayal was made by gov-
ernment institutions, which in recent years 
introduced the necessity of participation 
of loan and guarantee funds in the tender, 
when applying for funds from the EU. The 
introduction of fees auctions for funds man-
agement increased competition between 
funds and reduced trust between them. It 
also allowed the inclusion of private en-
terprises, trying to offer the same services 
and acquire the same funds in tenders. The 
second betrayal was the change of Bank 
Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK) policy en-
abling it to grant subsidized loans and guar-
antees directly to SMEs. It leads to the per-
ception of BGK as a competitor by funds 
employees, instead of the former image of a 
state-owned institution and a bank support-
ing the functioning of the funds. The most 
serious threat appears to be the fund man-
agers themselves. The biggest betrayal was 
the case of the Fundusz Mikro, in which 
the manager gathered 100% ownership. 
Next, she transformed the fund and turned 
it into a bank using the fund’s experience 
and customer base. The “privatization” of 
the fund may change into a shadow banking 
systems, offering loans to those who can-
not receive them at banks but a much higher 
cost than in banks. It can destroy the trust 
of entrepreneurs to this type of organization 
and cause that they will cease to effectively 
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achieve the goal for which they were estab-
lished, that is, the reduction of the equity 
gap.
The article shows how the different pur-
poses of each actor can affect or hinder the 
achievement of benefits for all actors. We 
pointed to the goals and problems they had 
to achieve to create a network to reach the 
primary goal, which was the creation of a 
sustainable market economy in Poland. Part 
of it is the microfinancing network of entre-
preneurs, banks, governmental institutions 
and funds (NGOs). It works quite successful-
ly enabling access to capital by entrepreneurs 
who could not get it from banks. However, 
betrayals committed by some actors may 
cause the system to collapse or change in the 
future, as actors will adopt different goals 
and new actors will join in. A change in the 
method of funds’ financing, limitation of EU 
financial resources, changing the needs of 
entrepreneurs, further transformations of the 
Polish banking system - all these events may 
result in the creation of a new network of 
connections and a new system.
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RAZVOJ USPJEŠNOG SUSTAVA MIKRO-FINANCIRANJA: 
PERSPEKTIVA TEORIJE AKTERA I MREŽA
Sažetak. Ovaj rad želi odgovoriti na sljedeće 
istraživačko pitanje: „Kako se akteri mobilizi-
raju za stvaranje mreže, koja promovira sustav 
mikro-financiranja u zemlji u tranziciji?“. U ovoj 
se studiji slučaja koristi teorija aktera i mreža 
kao alat za promatranje i interpretaciju. Autori 
su koristili fokusne skupine, dubinske intervjue i 
analizu dokumenata kao izvore podataka. U radu 
se pokazuje da svaki od aktera, iz različitih razlo-
ga, može djelovati, odnosno ograničiti ostvariva-
nje koristi za sve aktere. Ukazuje se na ciljeve i 
probleme koje je trebalo riješiti, kako bi se krei-
rala mreža s primarnim ciljem kreiranja održivog 
tržišnog gospodarstva u Poljskoj. Ključni akteri 
(vlada, mala i srednja poduzeća, banke, nevla-
dine organizacije) trebale su izgraditi mrežu za 
mikro-financiranje, koja prilično uspješno funkci-
onira. Ona osigurava pristup kapitalu poduzeći-
ma, koja ga ne mogu dobiti od banaka. Međutim, 
neetično ponašanje određenih aktera bi moglo 
djelovati na raspad ili promjenu sustava, kako 
akteri mijenjaju svoje ciljeve ili mu se novi akteri 
pridružuju. Promjene metoda financiranja garan-
cijskih fondova, ograničenja financijskih resursa 
EU-a, promjene potreba poduzetnika, kao i dalj-
nje transformacije poljskog bankovnog sustava 
mogu djelovati na stvaranje novih povezanosti 
unutar mreže, odnosno stvaranje novog sustava.
Ključne riječi: teorija aktera i mreža, kre-
diti, garancije, banke, mala i srednja poduzeća, 
zemlja u tranziciji
61
Management, Vol. 24, 2019, No.2, pp. 39-61
H. Waniak-Michalak, J. Michalak: DEVELOPMENT OF A ...
Appendix I Focus Research 
Date: 23.11.2018
Duration: 2.5 hours
Place: University of Lodz, Poland
Participants:
1. President of a Loan Fund since 1996
2. President of a Guarantee Fund since 2005
3. Coordinator of Loan Programs in Poland since 1992
4. Member of Management Board in a Loan Fund since 1989
5. President of a Loan Fund since 2013, previously the director in a bank
6. President of a Loan Fund since 2010, previously the manager in a bank
7. President of a Loan Fund since 2007, previously the mayor of a city
Appendix II In-depth interviews information
No. Interviewee Data of the interview Duration of the interview
1 President of a Loan Fund 11.01.2018 1,5 hours
2 President of a Guarantee Fund 18.01.2019 40 minutes

